Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would continue fighting for every mortgage while sharing more of the expensive machinery behind those loans under an investor’s proposal to place both government-sponsored enterprises beneath one publicly traded parent company.
That is how Jon Oksenholt, founder of Oksenholt Capital Management, describes his proposed U.S. Financial Technology and Mortgage Corporation, a Texas-based holding company that would own Fannie, Freddie, and their jointly controlled mortgage-securitization platform.
“The simplest way I can explain my proposal is this: Keep Fannie and Freddie competing where competition actually matters, but stop duplicating things that don’t need to be duplicated,” Oksenholt told NMP.
Under the proposal, Fannie and Freddie would retain their separate federal charters, capital, management teams, and boards. They would continue competing on loan pricing, underwriting, credit policy, mortgage products, and lender relationships.
Technology, data, cybersecurity, securitization infrastructure, procurement, and selected administrative functions could be consolidated.
The distinction is central to Oksenholt’s argument: Two enterprises could still compete for lenders’ business without maintaining two versions of every operation behind them.
But it also leaves a question with direct consequences for originators and servicers: Would two companies with the same owner remain genuine competitors when their profits ultimately flow to the same parent?
Compete For Loans, Share What Is Behind Them
Oksenholt said the holding company should not determine which enterprise wins a loan. Fannie and Freddie would maintain independent teams and boards and continue operating as separate mortgage guarantors.
“Fannie and Freddie should compete for every loan, but they don’t need to duplicate everything behind it,” he said.
The concept is not entirely without precedent. Fannie and Freddie already jointly own U.S. Financial Technology LLC, formerly Common Securitization Solutions, and use its Common Securitization Platform.
FHFA describes U.S. FinTech as the nation’s largest mortgage-backed securities issuing agent and administrator. It handles all new MBS issuance for the enterprises, along with post-issuance administration, disclosures, tax reporting, and payment-agent functions.
That shared system supports the Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security, allowing Fannie and Freddie to use common securitization infrastructure while each enterprise continues purchasing and guaranteeing mortgages separately.
Oksenholt wants to extend that logic further into the companies’ operations.
“Why are taxpayers, lenders, and ultimately borrowers paying for two of everything when Fannie and Freddie already share the most important piece of market infrastructure?” he said. “We think there is a lot more that can be shared without taking away the competition that actually matters to lenders and borrowers.”
Would The Savings Reach Borrowers?
Oksenholt Capital’s white paper and financial model identify approximately $1.3 billion in potential recurring after-tax annual synergies. The firm projects $39.6 billion in normalized earnings by 2032 and an illustrative value approaching $1 trillion at a 25-times earnings multiple.
Those figures are Oksenholt Capital’s projections, not government estimates or a proposed transaction price. The firm says the model’s assumptions can be adjusted and describes the analysis as illustrative rather than investment advice.
Oksenholt argues that some of the savings from eliminating duplicated functions could be passed through to lenders and borrowers.
“If we can run some of those things once instead of twice, we should be able to take real cost out of the system,” he said. “And at least some of those savings can be passed through to lenders and ultimately borrowers.”
Oksenholt, who said he is also a multifamily borrower, framed the proposal as more than a way to increase shareholder value.
“As a borrower, I want Fannie and Freddie competing for loans, but I simply don’t see how borrowers benefit from paying for unnecessary duplication behind them,” he said.
Whether consolidation lowers the cost of originating and selling a loan would depend on how savings affect guarantee fees, loan-level pricing, technology expenses, and other costs imposed on sellers and servicers.
MBA Opposes Common Ownership
The Mortgage Bankers Association has already warned against placing Fannie and Freddie under one holding company.
MBA President and CEO Bob Broeksmit argued in September 2025 that the enterprises should neither be merged nor placed under common ownership. He said maintaining at least two GSEs is necessary for a competitive, efficient, and resilient housing finance system.
“Creating a government-conferred monopoly would diminish innovation, degrade service to market participants, and heighten systemic risk by concentrating housing finance operations within a single entity,” Broeksmit wrote.
The trade group identified several areas where competition matters to lenders, including seller and servicer technology, mortgage products, customer service, representations-and-warranties enforcement, multifamily risk-sharing structures, and specialized expertise in condominium, manufactured-home, and renovation lending.
MBA supports standardization in areas where uniformity improves market efficiency. Its concern is that common ownership would go beyond shared infrastructure and weaken the economic incentive for Fannie and Freddie to compete.
Oksenholt argues that separate charters, boards, management, and regulatory oversight could preserve that rivalry.
“Fannie and Freddie would remain separately chartered, separately managed, and separately competing for business,” he said. “FHFA oversight and clear rules can make sure it stays that way in perpetuity.”
The unanswered issue is how those protections would be structured and enforced, particularly when the parent company would benefit financially regardless of which enterprise purchases a loan.
An Investor With A Stake In The Outcome
Oksenholt Capital has a direct financial interest in the GSEs’ future.
The firm disclosed in March that affiliated investment vehicles held more than 1 million Fannie and Freddie securities, including more than 700,000 shares of Freddie Mac common stock and positions in Fannie common and junior preferred shares issued by both enterprises.
Oksenholt also recently challenged Pershing Square Capital Management’s decision to assign Freddie a lower projected earnings multiple than Fannie, arguing that the companies’ recent performance did not support the valuation difference.
That interest does not invalidate the proposal, but it makes clear that the projected value is an investor’s thesis. The holding-company structure is not a plan that FHFA, Treasury, Fannie, or Freddie has said it is considering.
Capital And Conservatorship Remain
Creating a parent company would not, by itself, end the GSEs’ conservatorships or provide all the capital required for their release.
Fannie reported $116.5 billion in net worth as of June 30, after earning $4 billion during the second quarter. But it also reported a $14 billion deficit in available capital under the enterprise regulatory capital framework and a $208 billion shortfall against its risk-based adjusted total capital requirement, including buffers. The difference largely reflects Treasury’s $120.8 billion senior preferred position, which does not qualify as regulatory capital.
Freddie reported $78 billion in net worth and $3.8 billion in second-quarter earnings.
The figures illustrate the difference between accumulating GAAP net worth and satisfying the regulatory capital requirements that would apply outside conservatorship.
Treasury also retains a decisive role. Amendments announced in January 2025 restored Treasury’s right to approve any release of Fannie or Freddie from conservatorship. FHFA must first seek public input and assess the potential effects on the enterprises and housing market.
Treasury continues to hold senior preferred shares and warrants allowing it to purchase 79.9% of each enterprise’s common stock. How those interests are treated would substantially affect the value available to existing and future shareholders.
Oksenholt said the white paper presents what the firm believes is a viable route using existing FHFA authority, Treasury consent, and state corporate law, while acknowledging that other approaches may be possible.
“At its core, the idea is pretty simple: Keep two charters and two competitors, but stop paying for two of everything,” he said.
Whether that structure could be completed without congressional approval has not been tested.
Congress is simultaneously considering a different approach. As NMP recently reported, Rep. Scott Fitzgerald, R-Wis., introduced legislation that would establish statutory guardrails for releasing the enterprises from conservatorship. That proposal reflects the continuing disagreement over whether Congress, regulators, or the administration should define the future structure of the GSEs.
The Question For Lenders
Oksenholt said the lender-facing case rests on preserving competition in pricing, underwriting, products, and service while reducing duplicated costs behind those functions.
He is not advocating that Fannie and Freddie stop competing for mortgages. He is arguing that competition in pricing, underwriting, products, and service can coexist with shared technology and administrative infrastructure.
The Common Securitization Platform demonstrates that the enterprises can already share critical infrastructure while remaining separate loan purchasers. The unresolved question is how much further that model can be extended before shared operations become shared control.
For originators, the measure of the proposal is not whether investors eventually value the parent at $500 billion or $1 trillion. It is whether a lender would still have two meaningfully different executions, two sets of products and policies, and somewhere else to take a loan when one enterprise becomes less competitive.
The proposal now explains where Oksenholt believes competition should remain and where consolidation should begin. What remains untested is whether one parent could produce the projected savings while preserving meaningful competition between the enterprises over time.
